经济危机下国有经济应对信贷紧缩的机理
――基于博弈论的分析

谢敏    李冬

(综合开发研究院,广东深圳 518029;深圳市晓扬投资管理公司,广东深圳 518026

[内容摘要] 本文通过构建博弈论模型,分析了经济危机下信贷紧缩发生的机理,进而分析了国有经济在应对信贷紧缩中发挥的作用。本文还比较了2007年危机下美国和中国的信贷紧缩情况,对博弈模型的分析结果进行了验证。本文的研究结果表明经济危机下,宏观经济容易陷入信贷紧缩的困境,而国有经济在应对信贷紧缩中,可以发挥一定的积极作用,但国家通过国有经济干预宏观经济存在的严重弊端也不容忽视。

[关键词] 经济危机  信贷紧缩  国有经济  政府  博弈

[中图分类号] F830.2    [文献标识码] A    

[正文]  请下载PDF文件。

 

The Mechanism of State-owned Economy’s Responding to the Credit Crunch During Economic Crisis: An Analysis Based on Game Theory

Xie Min    Li Dong

(China Development Institute, Shenzhen 518029,

Everyoung Capital Management Ltd, Shenzhen 518026)

Abstract: Based on imperfect information dynamic game models, the author analyzed the mechanism of the occurrence of credit crunch and the mechanism of state-owned economy’s responding to the credit crunch during economic crisis. Furthermore, the author also compared the situation of the credit crunch in theUnited StatesandChinaduring 2007-2009. Our analysis implies that macro-economy tends to fall into the plight of the credit crunch during economic crisis, while state-owned economy can play a positive role in response to the credit crunch. But the serious shortcomings of government intervention also can not be ignored.

Key words: Economic Crisis; Credit Crunch; State-owned Economy; Government; Game Theory